

“Making Security Measurable”

An Integrated Framework for Cyber Security and Incident Response

26 October 2009



Robert A. Martin

ramartin@mitre.org



Today Everything's Connected

Your System is
attackable...




When this Other System gets subverted
through an un-patched vulnerability, a mis-
configuration, or an application weakness...

Making Security Measurable (MSM): You Are Here




Software Assurance




CWE, CAPEC

Enterprise Security Management




CPE, CCE, OVAL, XCCDF

Threat Management




CVE, CAPEC, MAEC

Cyber Threats Emerged Over Time



Like Security - Networks Evolved



Each new solution had to integrate with the existing solutions -
->> every enterprise ends up learning as they go and has a
“unique” tapestry of solutions with “local practices”

But A More Supportable
Solution Is Possible with
Standardized Approaches
and the application of
Architecting Principles



What Do The Informational Building Blocks for “Architecting Security” Look Like?

- Standard ways for **enumerating** “things we care about”
- **Languages/Formats** for encoding/carrying high fidelity content about the “things we care about”
- **Repositories** of this content for use in communities or individual organizations
- **Adoption/branding and vetting** programs to encourage adoption by tools and services



The Building Blocks Are:

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Tools

- Interpret IA, Cyber Security, and SwA content in context of enterprise network
- Methods for assessing compliance to languages, formats, and enumerations

Remembering the Acronyms

What IT systems do I have in my enterprise?

- **CPE** (Platforms)

What vulnerabilities do I need to worry about?

- **CVE** (Vulnerabilities)

What vulnerabilities do I need to worry about RIGHT NOW?

- **CVSS** (Scoring System)

How can I configure my systems more securely?

- **CCE** (Configurations)

How do I define a policy of secure configurations?

- **XCCDF** (Configuration Checklists)

How can I be sure my systems conform to policy?

- **OVAL** (Assessment Language)

What weaknesses in my software could be exploited?

- **CWE** (Weaknesses)

What attacks can exploit which weaknesses?

- **CAPEC** (Attack Patterns)

What should be logged, and how?

- **CEE** (Events)

How can I aggregate assessment results?

- **CRF** (Results)

How can we recognize malware?

- **MAEC** (Malware Attributes)

Standards included in the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP)

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SCAP-Based FDCC Guidance

Configuration Guidance




Configuration Guidance Analysis

Operations Security Management Processes

FDCC Compliant Tools



Operational Enterprise Networks



Enterprise IT Asset Management

Enterprise IT Change Management

Centralized Reporting

SCAP-Based FDCC Reporting


Configuration
Guidance



Configuration
Guidance
Analysis

Operations Security Management Processes

Operational Enterprise Networks



Enterprise IT Asset Management

FDCC Results

Enterprise IT
Change Management

FDCC Results

Centralized
Reporting



Sent: Wednesday, May 27, 2009 2:43 PM

Subject: Cyberspace Operations Culture Change

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I have signed a directive memo making an unequivocal statement about the importance of compliance with network related technical orders. This guidance will improve safety and efficiency on the AF-GIG and provide commanders a clear enforcement/disciplinary mechanism. MTOs, NTOs, and CCOs issued by the AFNETOPS/CC now have the same authority as aircraft maintenance technical orders and lawful general orders.

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This change is not easy, but compliance enables us to defend our networks - paramount in the face of increasing threats. Networks are a shared resource and a risk assumed by one is a risk exposed to all. Our Air Force must move to a system of tight network control, personal responsibility, and accountability as we execute our global mission on behalf of our Nation.

NORTON A. SCHWARTZ
General, USAF
Chief of Staff

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The Building Blocks Are:



CVE

OVAL

NIST/DHS NVD



Knowledge Repository

Vulnerability Alerts




Vulnerability Analysis

Operations Security Management Processes

OVAL "Compatible" Tools




Operational Enterprise Networks




Enterprise IT Asset Management

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
Centralized Reporting



CVE 1999 to 2009



CVE is Widely Used & Available 38,921 and climbing...



CVE Vendor/Industry Penetration



252 PRODUCTS AND SERVICES FROM 142 ORGANIZATIONS IN 25 COUNTRIES

The Consensus Audit Guidelines – Aimed at Auditable Items

Twenty Critical Controls for Effective Cyber Defense: Consensus Audit Guidelines

What the
20 Critical

This document is a first step toward providing specific audit guidelines that CISOs, CIOs, IGs, and the US-CERT can adopt to ensure their agency systems have the baseline security controls in place that are most critical. It takes advantage of the knowledge gained in analyzing the myriad attacks that are being actively and successfully launched against federal systems and our nation's industrial base systems and identifying the key controls that are most critical for stopping those attacks. This effort also takes advantage of the success and insights from the development and usage of standardized concepts for identifying, communicating, and documenting security-relevant characteristics/data. These standards include the following: | common identification of vulnerabilities (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures—CVE), definition of secure configurations (Common Configuration Enumeration—CCE), inventory of systems and platforms (Common Platform Enumeration—CPE), vulnerability severity (Common Vulnerability Scoring System—CVSS) and identification of application weaknesses (Common Weaknesses Enumeration—CWE). These standards have emerged over the last decade through collaborative research and deliberation between government, academia and industry. While still evolving, several of these efforts in standardization have made their way into commercial solutions and government, industry, and academic usage. Perhaps most visible of these has been the Federal Desktop Core Configuration (FDCC) which leveraged the Security Content Automation Program (SCAP). SCAP utilizes mature standardization efforts to clearly define common security nomenclature and evaluation criteria for vulnerability, patch, and configuration measurement guidance and is intended for adoption by automated tools. It is strongly recommended that automated tools used to implement or verify security controls identified in this document employ SCAP or similar standardization efforts for clearly defined nomenclature and evaluation criteria not covered by SCAP. Additional areas of standardization are emerging (e.g., application weaknesses, events, malware attributes, attack patterns, remediation actions) that in the future will be of benefit for some of the controls identified in this document.

- Critical Control 17: Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises
- Critical Control 18: Incident Response Capability
- Critical Control 19: Data Recovery Capability
- Critical Control 20: Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training to Fill Gaps



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The Building Blocks Are:



CPE

CV

CAPEC

CCE

SB

SS

CRF

XCCDF & OVAL

MAEC

CCSS


CWSS

DoD DIACAP & eMASS

e-MASS

Knowledge Repository

Vulnerability Type Trends: A Look at the CVE List (2001 - 2007)



Removing and Preventing the Vulnerabilities Requires More Specific Definitions...CWEs

- ◆ XSS
- buf
- ◆ sql-inject
- ✕ dot
- ✱ php-include
- infoleak
- dos-malform
- link
- format-string
- ◆ crypt
- priv
- ◆ perm
- ◆ metachar
- ✱ int-overflow

Failure to Sanitize Directives in a Web Page (aka 'Cross-site scripting' (XSS)) (79)

- Failure to Sanitize Script-Related HTML Tags in a Web Page (Basic XSS) (80)
- Failure to Sanitize Directives in an Error Message Web Page (81)
- Failure to Sanitize Script in Attributes of IMG Tags in a Web Page (82)
- Failure to Sanitize Script in Attributes in a Web Page (83)
- Failure to Resolve Encoded URI Schemes in a Web Page (84)
- Doubled Character XSS Manipulations (85)
- Invalid Characters in Identifiers (86)
- Alternate XSS syntax (87)

Failure to Constrain Operations within the Bounds of an Allocated Memory Buffer (119)

- Unbounded Transfer ('Classic Buffer Overflow') (120)
- Write-what-where Condition (123)
- Boundary Beginning Violation ('Buffer Underwrite') (124)
- Out-of-bounds Read (125)
- Wrap-around Error (128)
- Unchecked Array Indexing (129)
- Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size (131)
- Miscalculated Null Termination (132)
- Return of Pointer Value Outside of Expected Range (466)

Path Traversal (22)

- Relative Path Traversal (23)
 - Path Traversal: '\..filename' (29)
 - Path Traversal: '\dir\..filename' (30)
 - Path Traversal: 'dir\..filename' (31)
 - Path Traversal: '...' (Triple Dot) (32)
 - Path Traversal: '....' (Multiple Dot) (33)
 - Path Traversal: '.../' (34)
 - Path Traversal: '..../' (35)
- Absolute Path Traversal (36)
 - Path Traversal: '/absolute/pathname/here' (37)
 - Path Traversal: '\absolute\pathname\here' (38)
 - Path Traversal: 'C:dirname' (39)
 - Path Traversal: '\\UNC\share\name\' (Windows UNC Share) (40)


Printable PDFs of Entire CWE Available



CWE Version 1.4

Edited by:
Steven M. Christey, Conor O. Harris, and Janis E. Kenderdine

Project Lead:
Robert A. Martin





Attack Pattern 7
ID

Pattern Abstraction: Detailed

Typical
Severity

High

Description

Summary

Blind SQL Injection results from an insufficient mitigation for SQL Injection. Although suppressing database error messages are considered best practice, the suppression alone is not sufficient to prevent SQL Injection. Blind SQL Injection is a form of SQL Injection that overcomes the lack of error messages. Without the error messages that facilitate SQL Injection, the attacker constructs input strings that probe the target through simple Boolean SQL expressions. The attacker can determine if the syntax and structure of the injection was successful based on whether the query was executed or not. Applied iteratively, the attacker determines how and where the target is vulnerable to SQL Injection.

In order to achieve this using Blind SQL Injection, an attacker:


For example, an attacker may try entering something like "username' AND 1=1; --" in an input field. If the result is the same as when the attacker entered "username" in the field, then the attacker knows that the application is vulnerable to SQL Injection. The attacker can then ask yes/no questions from the database server to extract information from it. For example, the attacker can extract table names from a database using the following types of queries:

```
"username' AND ascii(lower(substring((SELECT TOP 1 name FROM sysobjects WHERE xtype='U'), 1, 1))) > 108".
```

If the above query executes properly, then the attacker knows that the first character in a table name in the database is a letter between m and z. If it doesn't, then the attacker knows that the character must be between a and l (assuming of course that table names only contain alphabetic characters). By performing a binary search on all character positions, the attacker can determine all table names in the database. Subsequently, the attacker may execute an actual attack and send something like:

```
"username'; DROP TABLE trades; --
```

Knowledge Repositories




CWE/CAPEC/
SBVR/MAEC

NVAPL/XCCDF/
CCE/CPE/CRF



Development & Sustainment Security Management Processes



Enterprise IT Asset Management



Twenty Critical Controls for Effective Cyber Defense Guidelines

What the 20 CSC Critics say...

20 Critical Security Controls - Version 2.0

- 20 Critical Security Controls - Introduction (Version 2.0)
- Critical Control 1: Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized
- Critical Control 2: Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized
- Critical Control 3: Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software Servers
- Critical Control 4: Secure Configurations for Network Devices
- Critical Control 5: Boundary Defense
- Critical Control 6: Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of A
- **Critical Control 7: Application Software Security**
- Critical Control 8: Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges
- Critical Control 9: Controlled Access Based on Need to Know
- Critical Control 10: Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and
- Critical Control 11: Account Monitoring and Control

CAG: Critical Control 7: Application Software Security

<< previous control

Consensus Audit Guidelines

next control >>

How do attackers exploit the lack of this control?

Attacks against vulnerabilities in web-based and other application software have been a top priority for criminal organizations in recent years. Application software that does not properly check the size of user input, fails to sanitize user input by filtering out unneeded but potentially malicious character sequences, or does not initialize and clear variables properly could be vulnerable to remote compromise. Attackers can inject specific exploits, including buffer overflows, SQL injection attacks, and cross-site scripting code to gain control over vulnerable machines. In one attack in 2008, more than 1 million web servers were exploited and turned into infection engines for visitors to those sites using SQL injection. During that attack, trusted websites from state governments and other organizations compromised by attackers were used to infect hundreds of thousands of browsers that accessed those websites. Many more web and non-web application vulnerabilities are discovered on a regular basis.

To avoid su
to find sec
conducted
conduct su

CWE and CAPEC included in Control 7 of the “Twenty Most Important Controls and Metrics for Effective Cyber Defense and Continuous FISMA Compliance”

Procedures and tools for implementing this control:

Source code testing tools, web application security scanners, and penetration testing tools have proven useful in securing application software, along with manual application security penetration testing by testers who have extensive programming knowledge as well as application penetration testing expertise. The Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) is utilized by many such tools to identify the weaknesses that they find. Organizations can also use CWE to determine which types of weaknesses they are most interested in addressing and removing. A broad community effort to identify the “Top 25 Most Dangerous Programming Errors” is available as a minimum set of important issues to investigate and address. When evaluating the effectiveness of testing for these weaknesses, the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) can be used to organize and record the breadth of the testing for the CWEs as well as a way for testers to think like attackers in their development of test cases.



Common Criteria version 4 will utilize CAPEC and CWE



Sec

- The way how the CAPEC and related CWE taxo the developer, which needs to consider and pro mitigation to all applicable attacks and weaknes
- The way how the CAPEC and related CWE taxo the evaluator, which needs to consider all the a be able to exploit all the related software weak subsequent AVA_VAN activities.
- How incomplete entries from the CAPEC are to evaluation.
- How to incorporate to the evaluation attacks a in the CAPEC.

Determining attack potential for current CAPEC attacks

Having assigned in the above the corresponding attack potential contribution numeric values wrt all the attack potential factors, summarized as follows, the CEM B.4.2.2 Annex section Table 4 "Rating of vulnerability and TOE resistance" is ready to determine the attack potential for the CAPEC attacks that are associated with specific [CWE](#) weakness(es).

Attack potential factor	Value
The CAPEC attack "elapsed time" is deemed as "less than one day"	0
The CAPEC schema description "high" for its "Attacker Skill or Knowledge Required" at most is mapped only to the CEM B.4.2.2 Annex section "proficient persons" for its "specialist expertise" factor	3
The CAPEC schema description "high" for its "Attacker Skill or Knowledge Required" at most is mapped only to the CEM B.4.2.2 Annex section "restricted information concerning the TOE" for its "knowledge of the TOE" factor	3
For those CAPEC attacks having related CWE weakness(es), their "windows of opportunity" is deemed as "unnecessary/unlimited access"	0
The CAPEC schema description "Resources Required" at most is mapped only to the CEM B.4.2.2 Annex section "standard equipment" for its "IT hardware/software or other equipment" factor	0
Total	6 (which is the sum of the above)

Since the total value due to all the attack potential factors is 6, the CEM B.4.2.2 Annex section Table 4 indicates that the attack potential for the CAPEC attacks that are associated with specific [CWE](#) weakness(es) is "basic".

Since an EAL2 TOE must demonstrate resistance to attacks with a "basic" attack potential in accordance with the "[Part 3: Security assurance components](#)" of [Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 2](#), any TOE attempting to claim EAL2 or higher must address the CAPEC attacks that are associated with specific [CWE](#) weakness(es).


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
Knowledge Repository

NIST/DHS NVD


Knowledge Repositories



Operations Security Management Processes





Operational Enterprise Networks




Enterprise IT Asset Management










CWE/CAPEC/SBVR/CWSS/MAEC/OVAL/XCCDF/CCE/CPE/CRF



CVE/CWE/CVSS/CCE/CCSS/OVAL/XCCDF/CPE/CAPEC/MAEC/CWSS/CEE/CRF

CVE/CWE/CVSS/CCE/CCSS/OVAL/XCCDF/CPE/CAPEC/MAEC/CWSS/CEE/CRF


Development & Sustainment Security Management Processes




Enterprise IT Asset Management

Mitigating Risk Exposures


Responding to Security Threats




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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



Knowledge Repositories



Knowledge Repositories









“Group A” Network


First Level Vulnerability Examination Results

	CVE Name: 2003-0109 OVAL109	CVE Name: 2003-0352 OVAL296	CVE Name: 2003-0223 OVAL66	CVE Name: 2003-0228 OVAL321	CVE Name: 2003-0660 OVAL198
System 1 10.0.0.121	no	yes	no	yes	yes
System 2 10.0.0.122	no	yes	no	no	no
System 3 10.0.0.123	no	yes	no	yes	no
System 4 10.0.1.124	yes	no	yes	no	yes
System 5 10.0.2.125	yes	no	no	no	no





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Making Security Measurable

A Collection of Information Security Community Standardization Activities and Initiatives

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Measurable security pertains at a minimum to the following areas:

- Vulnerability Management
- Asset Security Assessment
- Configuration Guidance
- Malware Response
- Threat Analysis
- Intrusion Detection
- Asset Management
- Patch Management
- Incident Management

Enumerations	Languages	Repositories
<p>CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) - common vulnerability identifiers</p> <p>CWE Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)™ - list of software weakness types</p> <p>CAPEC Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)™ - list of common attack patterns</p> <p>CCE Common Configuration Enumeration (CCE)™ - common security configuration identifiers</p> <p>CPE Common Platform Enumeration (CPE)™ - common platform identifiers</p> <p>CVE/SANS Top 25 - consensus list of the 25 most dangerous programming errors</p> <p>Center for Internet Security (CIS) Consensus Security Metrics Definitions - set of standard metrics and data definitions that can be used across organizations to collect and analyze data on security process performance and outcomes</p> <p>Twenty Most Important Controls and Metrics for Effective Cyber Defense and Continuous FISMA Compliance - twenty key actions or security "controls" that organizations must take to block or mitigate known and reasonably expected attacks</p> <p>SANS Top Twenty - SANS/FBI consensus list of the Twenty Most Critical Internet Security Vulnerabilities that uses CVE-IDs to identify the issues</p> <p>OWASP Top Ten - ten most critical Web application security flaws</p> <p>WASC Web Security Threat Classification - list of Web security threats</p>	<p>OVAL Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language (OVAL) - standard for determining vulnerability and configuration issues</p> <p>CRF Common Result Format (CRF)™ - standardized assessment result format for conveying findings based on common names and naming schemes</p> <p>CEE Common Event Expression (CEE)™ - standardizes the way computer events are described, logged, and exchanged</p> <p>Open Checklist Reporting Language (OCRL)™ - standard for creating reports used in compliance evaluation</p> <p>Benchmark Development - resources for creating standards-based, structured, and automatable security guidance</p> <p>OVAL Interpreter - free tool for collecting information for testing, carrying out OVAL Definitions, and presenting results of the tests</p> <p>Benchmark Editor™ - free tool that enhances and simplifies creation and editing of benchmark documents written in XCCDF and OVAL</p> <p>Recommendation Tracker™ - free tool that facilitates the development of automated security benchmarks</p> <p>Extensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF) - specification language for uniform expression of security checklists, benchmarks, and other configuration guidance</p> <p>Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) - open standard that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response</p> <p>Common Announcement Interchange Format (CAIF) - XML-based format created to store and exchange security announcements in a normalized way</p> <p>OMG Semantics of Business Vocabulary and Business Rules (SBVR) - language for interchange of business vocabularies and rules among organizations and software tools</p>	<p>OVAL OVAL Repository - community-developed OVAL Vulnerability, Compliance, Inventory, and Patch Definitions</p> <p>National Vulnerability Database (NVD) - U.S. vulnerability database based on CVE that integrates all publicly available vulnerability resources and references</p> <p>NIST Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) - security content for automating technical control compliance activities, vulnerability checking, and security measurement</p> <p>Red Hat Repository - OVAL Patch Definitions corresponding to Red Hat Errata security advisories</p> <p>Center for Internet Security (CIS) Benchmarks - best-practice security configurations accepted for compliance with FISMA, the ISO standard, GLB, SOX, HIPAA, and FERPA, and other regulatory requirements for information security</p> <p>DISA Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGS) - U.S. Defense Information Systems Agency's (DISA) STIGS are configuration standards for OOD information assurance and information assurance-enabled devices and systems</p>

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Page Last Updated: June 30, 2009

The image features a solid blue background. In the upper half, there is a dark silhouette of a dog, possibly a Weimaraner, shown in profile facing right. Its tail is long and curved upwards. In the lower half, there is a dark silhouette of a cat, also in profile facing right. The word "Questions?" is written in a white, sans-serif font, centered horizontally and positioned between the two animal silhouettes.

Questions?