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**NIST**  
National Institute of  
Standards and Technology

**National Vulnerability Database**  
automating vulnerability management, security measurement, and compliance checking

# National Vulnerability Database Product Ontology


Paul Cichonski

Booz Allen Hamilton / NIST



# Agenda



- Overview of Ontology Goals
- Overview of NVD Product Ontology
- Overview of Inferencing Use Case for Querying Across Product Ranges.




# NVD Product Ontology Goals

- Ontology must support NVD's primary use case involving making statements of applicability between IT concepts (e.g. CVEs, Checklists) and IT products.
- Ontology must support the ability to make statements of applicability at various levels of abstraction and across ranges of products (e.g. Microsoft Windows version 4.3 to 5.6).
- Ontology must support the ability to capture granular product identification data which may vary on a per product basis.
- Ontology must support the Common Platform Enumeration which is the standardized method for naming IT products.

# High-level NVD Ontology Overview









# Structure of the Ontology

- NVD Ontology models two separate concept structures as formal “is-a” hierarchies.
  - Category concept hierarchy
  - Identification concept hierarchy
- NVD Ontology also includes other types of semantic relationships.
  - Relationships between applications and codebases (“made up of” relationships)
  - Explicit differences between sets of products created by defining disjoint sets (e.g. hardware vs. software products)

# High-level NVD Ontology Overview




# Product Category Hierarchy





## Possible Predicates

- *hasIdentification*, domain of Product, range of IdentificationStrategy, <owl:inverseFunctionalProperty>
- *hasReleaseDate*, domain of Product
- *hasCpeName*, domain of Product
- *usesSharedLibrary*, domain of Application, range of SharedLibrary
- *contains*, domain of Product, range of Product, inverseOf *containedIn*
- *hasOwner*, domain of Product, range of Foaf:Agent, inverseOf *ownedBy*
- *hasAutomationTest*, domain of Product
- Many other possibilities exist, very granular predicates can be defined further down tree.




# Identification Concept Hierarchy



Product instance data related to an IdentificationStrategy through the predicate hasIdentification


## Possible Predicates

- *hasName*, domain of IdentificationStrategy
- *hasModelNumber*, domain of PhysicalDeviceIdentificationStrategy
- *hasCiscoTrainIdentifier*, domain of CiscoIOS\_Strategy
- *hasCiscoInterimBuildNumber*, domain of CiscoIOS\_Strategy
- *hasMicrosoftMajorVersion*, domain of NTKernel\_Strategy
- *hasVersion*, domain of GenericIdentificationStrategy
- *hasUpdate*, domain of GenericIdentificationStrategy




# Product Instance Data Instantiated from Model Classes


Model



Instance Data



# *hasIdentification* Property Uniquely Identifies a Product



## Definition of InverseFunctionalProperty:

If a property,  $P$ , is tagged as InverseFunctional then for all  $x, y, z$ :  
 $P(y, x)$  and  $P(z, x)$  implies  $y = z$

OR


*N3 Syntax*

```

P rdf:Type owl:InverseFunctionalProperty .
Y P X .
Z P X .
Infer that:
Y owl:sameAs Z .
    
```


# Ontology will provide backwards compatibility with CPE 2.x

- CPE names can be generated from product instance data in a formalized way due to the granular way in which IdentificationStrategies are modeled.
- If modeled with SWRL rules, this backwards compatibility logic will live in the model.




# The Ontology Provides the Capability for Modeling Ranges of Products

- This is accomplished with four predicates
  - *hasNextVersion*, *hasPreviousVersion*
  - *hasLaterVersion* (transitive), *hasEarlierVersion* (transitive)
- These four predicates are modeled using a predicate hierarchy such that the non-transitive predicates are related to the transitive predicates through `rdfs:subPropertyOf`.



# Inferencing for Product Range Data



## Assert:

*X hasNextVersion n2*

## Infer:


*X hasLaterVersion n2*

*n2 hasPreviousVersion X*

*n2 hasEarlierVersion X*

- The reasoner creates inferred triples which allow an observer to see all products in a version chain earlier and later than x. Inferred triples are also captured for n<sub>0</sub>, n<sub>1</sub>, n<sub>2</sub>, and n<sub>3</sub>.
- The version chain DOES have to be captured by a human since a version chain order is ambiguous

- In the future if IdentificationStrategies are modeled fully it may be possible to encode version chain order into the model and let the reasoner figure it out.




# Querying for Product Range Data

- Analysts populate version chain using non-transitive predicates (hasNextVersion and hasPerviousVersion)
- A SPARQL query could then be written against the transitive predicates which the reasoner has inferred.
- Querying against the transitive predicates allow system to determine all “earlier” and all “later” versions (i.e. a product range).

```
SELECT ?product
WHERE {
    ?product a nvd:product
    ?product nvd:hasEarlierVersion 3.2
    ?product nvd:hasLaterVersion 5.4
}
```

- Keeps all application logic for range relationships in model
- This DOES require instance data to be fully populated
- Could potentially explode triples



# Contact Information

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
<http://nvd.nist.gov>



# Extra

# Ontology Provides the Means to Make More Granular Statements of Applicability


- Shared Library (e.g. DLL, JAR) instance data can be captured and related to typical product instance data.
  - Through predicates such as *usesSharedLibrary*.
  - Analysts can then associate vulnerabilities with shared libraries and simple queries can be used to determine all products which use the shared library.
- Classes can be added to the Model to capture codebases.
  - Relationships can then be asserted on instance data to relate products to the codebase from which they originate (e.g. *isBasedOnCodeFrom*).
  - Analysts can assign vulnerability to a specific codebase, and the system can generate the list of all applicable products.
- These predicates could become the standard way for all product ontologies to declare these relationships.
  - This would provide a shared understanding across a wide set of data.



# Statements of Applicability can be Modeled as First Class Individuals

- Applicability statements are a way of relating a grouping of products to a particular IT concept (e.g. CVE, CCE, Checklist).
- If modeled as actual classes in an ontology applicability statements will provide the ability to create groupings of products at various levels of abstraction depending on the needs of a use case.
  - Possible to represent all products in a certain range
  - Possible to represent all products that use a certain shared library
- Predicates can be defined to capture relationships between applicability statements
  - Possible to express that one applicability statement is a prerequisite for another statement to be possible on a network
  - Possible to express that one applicability statement subsumes another statement.

# Applicability Statements Modeled as First Class Individuals




## Possible Predicates

- Predicates capturing information relating to products encompassed by a applicability statement
  - *includesProduct*, domain of *ApplicabilityStatement*, range of *Product*, inverseOf *memberOf*
  - *memberOf*, domain of *Product*, range of *ApplicabilityStatement*, inverseOf *includesProduct*
  - *minimumProduct*, domain of *ProductRangeStatement*, range of *Product*
  - *maximumProduct*, domain of *ProductRangeStatement*, range of *Product*
  - *sharedLibrary*, domain of *SharedLibraryStatement*, range of *SharedLibrary*
- Predicates capturing relationships between applicability statements and IT concepts (e.g. *CVE*, *CCE*, *Checklist*)
  - *hasApplicabilityStatement*, domain of some IT concept, range of *ApplicabilityStatement*, inverseOf *appliesTo*
  - *appliesTo*, domain of *ApplicabilityStatement*, range of some IT concept, inverseOf *hasApplicabilityStatement*
- Predicates capturing relationships between applicability statements and other applicability statements
  - *hasPrerequisite*, domain of *ApplicabilityStatement*, range of *ApplicabilityStatement*, inverseOf *prerequisiteFor*
  - *prerequisiteFor*, domain of *ApplicabilityStatement*, range of *ApplicabilityStatement*, inverseOf *hasPrerequisite*
  - *subsumes*, domain of *ApplicabilityStatement*, range of *ApplicabilityStatement*, inverseOf *subsumedBy*

# Defining Product Class Membership through Applicability Statements

- Model may want to include a class defining the set of all products for which a certain CVE is applicable.
- This can be done by defining a relationship between an applicability statement and the class to which all products included in the statement belong (e.g. `hasMembershipClass`).

Set of all products for which  
CVE-2001-0001 is applicable



 = <owl:Class>  
 = instance data


## Assert:

```
product_xyz memberOf statement_021  
product_234 memberOf statement_021
```

## Infer:

```
product_xyz rdf:type CVE-2001-0001Products  
product_234 rdf:type CVE-2001-0001Products
```

# Possible to Capture Relationships Where Statements of Applicability Subsume Others



Set of all applicability statements that match conditions on a Organization A's network

## orgA:FoundOnNetwork

```
orgA:FoundOnNetwork owl:subClassOf  
[ a owl:Restriction;  
  owl:onProperty hasApplicabilityStatement;  
  owl:allValuesFrom orgA:FoundOnNetwork].
```

## orgA:ExistingVulnerability

```
orgA:ExistingVulnerability owl:equivalentClass  
[ a owl:Restriction;  
  owl:onProperty hasApplicabilityStatement;  
  owl:someValuesFrom orgA:FoundOnNetwork].
```

## Assert:


```
statement_0234 rdf:type orgA:FoundOnNetwork
```

## Infer:

```
statement_579 rdf:type orgA:FoundOnNetwork  
CVE-2001-0002 rdf:type orgA:ExistingVulnerability  
CVE-2001-0011 rdf:type orgA:ExistingVulnerability
```

# The Same Product Resource can be Described by Heterogeneous Viewpoints using disparate Ontologies

Security automation  
community's viewpoint of  
product data



## A Formalized Model will Allow for a Shared Understanding of How To Capture Normalized Product Data

- The IdentificationStrategy hierarchy provides a method to define vendor's versioning strategies.
  - The granularity of the model is up to the community.
  - The model itself will show users the types of relationships that must be captured to identify a product.
- In the future it may even be possible to create a complementary ontology which tells user's HOW to find the data
  - Ex) where to look, commands, API calls.
  - This will really allow us to put most of the logic in the ontology itself and provide a high level of confidence for users creating product instance data.

# Inferencing for Broad Statements of Applicability

- Possible to define classes to identify all individuals which meet a desired criteria.
- For example, a class could be defined to capture all CiscoIOS Products

```
<owl:Class rdf:ID="OperatingSystem_1">
  <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#OperatingSystem"/>
  <rdfs:label rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"
    >CiscoIOSProduct</rdfs:label>
  <owl:equivalentClass>
    <owl:Restriction>
      <owl:onProperty rdf:resource="#hasIdentification"/>
      <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource="#CiscoIOS_Strategy"/>
    </owl:Restriction>
  </owl:equivalentClass>
</owl:Class>
```